Financial Market Failures

Economics 301: Money and Banking

Goals and Learning Outcomes

- Goals:
 - Learn about the types of problems (market failures) that can be inherent in financial markets.
 - Learn about solutions to these problems.
- Learning Outcomes:
 - LO1: Understand and appreciate the importance of financial markets for the overall functioning of the economy.

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• Read Hubbard and O'Brien, Chapter 9.

- Transaction costs: Explicit costs carrying out financial transactions. Often times the term means to generally include implicit information costs.
- Information costs: Includes time and resources spent investigating risks and profitability of financial investment
- Imagine you have \$500 to save, want to earn interest. Imagine no financial intermediaries.
 - Buy stocks directly from companies. Adequate diversification involves prohibitively high transaction costs for every purchase
 - Contribute to car loans or home loans
 - Make direct loans to local small businesses or entrepreneurial projects.
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- **Economies of scale:** as a financial institution gets larger, there is a reduction in the average transaction cost (transaction cost per dollar of financial investment).
- Market-wide economies of scale: standardization of legal contracts and computer software, eg: mortgage.

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- Abacus 2007-AC1 was a CDO constructed from 90 MBS's, each constructed from thousands of individual mortgages.
- Only two buyers: other sophisticated financial intermediaries (IKB Deutsche Industriebank and ACA Capital).
- Moody's and S&P gave highest rating to the CDO.
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- Situation in which it is impossible for lenders to obtain complete information about the risk of potential borrowers.
- Lender necessarily makes interest rates too high for borrowers who privately know they have very low risk.
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- Interest rates are therefore higher.
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 - Passes on risk from lender to borrower
 - Can credibly communicate risk from borrower to lender.
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- Methods to reduce moral hazard:
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 - Restrictive covenants
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